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The principles of self-determination in medical matters and to respect people's decision 
not to be treated are implemented in German health law.1 The law concerning medical 
treatment applies equally to people with mental illnesses. Yet, there are also protective 
measures for cases of significant risks to others or oneself. The German law offers 
legal possibilities for forced medical treatment2 and forced hospitalization to protect 
life and health of adults with serious mental illnesses that lead to impaired decision-
making capacity and the denial of medical treatment.3 
 
However, from the perspective of German fundamental law as well as human rights, 
the interference with physical integrity and self-determination to prevent self-damage 
is a difficult issue and has led to landmark decisions on national level concerning forced 
medical treatment.4 In the decision of the 26th of July 2016,5 the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (BVerfG) as Germany’s institution to interpret fundamental rights, 
defined a duty of the state to protect vulnerable adults and therefore to use protective 
measures. This includes medical treatment against the natural will6 under narrowly 
defined preconditions as a last resort.7 Deviating from former court decisions, the 
German Court did not decide about the permissibility of a treatment to regain the 
capacity to consent, but a somatic treatment to save the patient's life. In its reasoning 
the court considered the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ 
reports and guidelines, as well as the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). As already stated in a previous order on forced medical treatment, the court 
 
1 As for example in the §§ 630a-630h BGB (German Civil Code) dealing with the treatment contract or 
§ 1901a BGB which deals with the advance directive for health care. 
2 The terms ‘involuntary medical treatment' and 'forced medical treatment' are used synonymously in 
this report and refer to a medical treatment against the will of a person. This treatment can either be 
of somatic or psychiatric nature. The term 'involuntary treatment' has no common definition in 
international law, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 'Involuntary placement and 
involuntary treatment of persons with mental health problems', 2012, p. 9, available at 
https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/involuntary-placement-and-involuntary-treatment-of-persons-
with-mental-health-problems_en.pdf (last accessed 22nd Dec. 2019).  
3 On the basis of the federal adult protection law see § 1906 and § 1906a BGB; on the basis of public 
law there are 16 different mental health acts concerning the treatment of mentally ill people. 
4 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09 = BVerfGE 128, 282 = NJW 
2011, 2113; BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15 = BVerfGE 142, 313= 
BVerfG NJW 2017, 53. 
5 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, available in English at 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/e/ls20160726_1bvl000815en.html (last accessed 28th Dec. 
2019). 
6 "Treatment against the natural will" is the German definition for involuntary medical treatment. 
7 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 71. 




saw no contradiction in protective measures by the state including forced medical 
treatment as a last resort to the mentioned human rights treaties.8  
 
However, the legitimacy of involuntary measures as involuntary hospitalization and 
forced medical treatment is discussed on international level as well.9 Whether 
involuntary measures should be completely banned against the background of the 
human rights treaties or whether they only require strict regulation is still 
controversially considered.10 Especially the United Nations Convention on Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities11 (CRPD) encourages to rethink and discuss existing laws and 
practices concerning involuntary measures.12 Perspectives, especially on 'will and 
preferences' Art. 12 (4) CRPD thereby differ considerably.13  
 
8 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09, para 52; for further information 
on the case see footnote 46. 
9 Overview of the different UN Committee positions S. Gurbai and W. Martin, 'Is Involuntary Placement 
and Non-Consensual Treatment Ever Compliant with UN Human Rights Standards?', available at 
https://autonomy.essex.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EAP-UN-Survey.pdf (last accessed 20th 
Dec. 2019); older report from the European point of view, European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, 'Involuntary placement and involuntary treatment of persons with mental health problems', 
2012, p. 9, available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/involuntary-placement-and-involuntary-
treatment-of-persons-with-mental-health-problems_en.pdf (last accessed 22nd Dec. 2019). 
10 Compiling the opinions of human rights stakeholders such as the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
persons with disabilities and other human rights experts who encourages the abolition of involuntary 
treatment and placement, 'Mental health and human rights, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights', UN Doc. A/HRC/39/36 of 24th July 2018. Furthermore, the 'Statement 
by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to oppose the Draft Additional Protocol to 
the Oviedo Convention', Sept. 2018, available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/Statements/StatementOviedo_CRPD20th.docx 
(last accessed 28th Dec. 2019) stresses that the legitimacy of involuntary treatment and placement 
opposes Art. 14, 17 and 25 CRPD. Also, for the abolition of regulations allowing involuntary treatment 
and placement in its latest report, the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
'Concluding observations on the combined second and third periodic reports of Spain', UN Doc. 
CRPD/C/ESP/CO/2-3, para 26-30. More moderate view on involuntary treatment: Human Rights 
Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/AZE/CO/4 no. 13 ("psychiatric confinement is applied only as a measure 
of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time and that the confinement is strictly 
necessary and proportionate for the purpose of protecting the individuals in question from serious harm 
or from preventing injury to others"); Council of Europe: 'Draft Additional Protocol concerning the 
protection of human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder with regard to involuntary 
placement and involuntary treatment', DH-BIO/INF (2018) 7, see Art. 10 and 11. 
11 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) passed by the general 
assembly of the United Nations 13th December 2006. 
12 E. Flynn, ‘Disability, Deprivation Of Liberty and Human Rights Norms: Reconciling European and 
International Approaches‘, International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law, 2016, 75-101; P. 
Cuenca Gómez, M. Barranco Avilés and P. Rodríguez des Pozo, ‘Psychosocial Disability And Deprivation 
Of Liberty: Reviewing The Case Of Qatar In The Light Of The Convention On The Rights Of Persons 
With Disabilities‘, International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law, 2018, 55-77; P. Fennell, 
in: I. Bantekas & M. Stein & D. Anastasiou (edit.), ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities: a commentary’, Oxford University Press, 2018, Art. 15, 437-442; Favorizing a strict 
abolition of involuntary measures: T. Minkowitz, 'Abolishing mental health laws to comply with the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities', in: B. McSherry, P. Weller (edit.), 'Rethinking 
Rights-Based Mental Health Laws' Oxford and Portland', Hart Publishing, 2010, 151–177. 
13 G. Szmukler, ‘"Capacity", "best interest", "will and preferences" and the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities‘, World Psychiatry, 2019, 34-41; For example, some interpretations divide 
the term "will and preferences", giving "will" and "preference" different values in the will determination 
process. See A. Ward and P. Curk, ‘"Respecting 'will': Viscount Stair and online shopping"‘, BtPrax, 2019, 
54-58; A. Arstein-Kerslake & E. Flynn, ' The General Comment on Article 12 of the Convention on the 





Human rights are mandatory guidelines for national law. But the texts of treaties as 
CRPD and ECHR often do not provide solutions to specific problems and need 
interpretation. However, the practical application of incorporated international law in 
national cases and the interpretation of indefinite terminology is often up to national 
courts.14 Therefore, besides international institutions, the national courts play an 
important role in interpreting human rights by applying them15 and it is worthwhile to 
have a closer look at national decisions considering international human rights treaties. 
 
This report intends to explain the case and arguments of the BVerfG in the order of 
the 26th July 2016 in the context of CRPD and ECHR. The relationship to the 
interpretations of the CRPD Committee and the ECtHR case-law will be addressed in 
particular. 
 
II. THE COURT’S CASE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF  
GERMAN ADULT PROTECTION LAW 
 
A. A brief introduction to German adult protection law 
 
Germany has got a two-tiered legal system for the protection of adults. One tier is 
based on private mandates as the enduring power of attorney (Vorsorgevollmacht), 
which is a fully equivalent, private alternative to the second tier, the statutory system 
Rechtliche Betreuung.16 The German “Betreuung” is an instrument for the legal 
protection of adults in need of help. It ensures the exercising and protecting of the 
rights of the adult by appointing a legal representative by court order without 
incapacitating the adult or restricting legal capacity. Measures of protection for an adult 
are dealt with by a special court (a department of the local court), the 
“Betreuungsgericht,”, hereafter referred to as guardianship court. The “Betreuer” 
(court-appointed legal representative) takes care of the specific matters assigned to 
him in the individual case and is obliged to respect the will and preferences of the 
adult, § 1901 (3) German Civil Code (BGB). It is only as a last resort, i.e. if advising 
and assisting the adult proves unsuccessful, that the court-appointed legal 
representative may use his power to represent the adult in his or her affairs. The 
affected person remains able to give consent, even though he or she might have a 
legal representative for matters of health care. 
 
 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: a roadmap for equality before the law', The International Journal of 
Human Rights 20(4), 471-490. 
14 There are differences in incorporation of international law. Germany has incorporated the CRPD as a 
federal law. 
15 On the different roles of national courts in applying international humanitarian law, S. Weill, 'The Role 
of National Courts in Applying International Humanitarian Law', Oxford University Press, 2014. 
16 "Betreuung" is an instrument for the legal protection of adults by appointing a legal representative 
by court order without incapacitation, for further English explanation of the term see 
https://www.wcag2016.de/fileadmin/Mediendatenbank_WCAG/Tagungsmaterialien/Glossar.pdf (last 
accessed 28th Dec. 2019); The law of "Betreuung" is based on the principles of necessity and autonomy. 
Voluntary (private) measures such as a continuing power of attorney for health care have priority, see 
§ 1896 (2) BGB. 




According to the law, with the exception of emergency cases, every medical treatment 
requires the informed consent of the patient. Doubts on the adult’s capacity to consent 
have to be verified for each medical intervention by the physician. Due to mental 
illness, a patient might not understand the importance or consequences of treatment 
and thus cannot give informed consent. In this case his legal representative has to 
consent for him (§ 630d (1) BGB) if he does not have an advance directive in health 
care (§ 1901a (1) BGB) consenting or disagreeing with the needed medical treatment. 
 
The ultimate limit of these regulations is the natural will of the adult. The term ‘natural 
will’ in the context of the court implies any wish or will that is consciously expressed 
without necessarily being legally effective in terms of not having the capacity to 
consent.17 Any medical treatment against the natural will of a patient is characterized 
as involuntary medical treatment18 and therefore needs to accomplish the legal 
requirements and approval by court. Therefore, only in exceptional cases and under 
very strict conditions, German law allows forced medical treatment.19  
 
Due to the federalist system, there are rules on forced medical treatment and 
deprivation of liberty regulated in the adult protection law Betreuung as well as in the 
Mental Health Acts of the 16 individual German states. These state laws do not require 
a consent of a legal representative and can concern a threat to the safety of others as 
well.20 The Mental Health Acts differ in detail, usually apply to urgent cases and are 
not covered by the addressed BVerfG’s decision.21 
 
B. The case 
 
The case dealt with by the BVerfG concerned a woman who suffered from a 
schizoaffective psychosis. She was under supervision of the German statutory adult 
protection system “Betreuung”. Her court-appointed legal representative was assigned 
to manage matters of health care for her.22 She was accommodated in a care facility, 
where she refused to take medication for her autoimmune disorder and expressed the 
intent to commit suicide. After having been transferred to a closed dementia unit with 
the approval of the guardianship court, her illnesses were treated against her natural 
will on the basis of multiple court orders. At the hospital it was discovered that she 
also suffered from breast cancer. At this point she was physically weakened to such 
an extent, that she could neither leave the hospital, nor did she want to leave. 
 
 
17 For an English explanation see A. Ward, ‘A major step forward in CRPD compliance by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court?’, Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, (70), Nov. 2016, 22, 30; G. Szmukler, 
'The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 'Rights, will and preferences' in relation 
to mental health disabilities' International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, (54), 2017, 90, 92. 
18 This can either be psychiatric or somatic treatment. 
19 See § 1906 BGB (old version), which respects the requirements set by BVerfG, Order of the Second 
Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09; BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 12 October 2011 – 2 
BvR 633/11 = BVerfGE 129, 269 = NJW 2011, 3571. 
20 According to several decisions of the BVerfG, these regulations had to be reviewed and are mostly 
subject to revision to new standards. 
21 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 71 the court refers to "persons 
under custodianship". 
22 There is no distinction between psychiatric and somatic matters of health care in Germany. 




The woman was considered unable to give her consent to the medical treatment for 
the breast cancer. But she was able to express her natural will and communicated that 
she did not wish to be treated. Therefore, her court-appointed legal representative 
applied to the guardianship court for the extension of the patient’s forced 
hospitalization and for involuntary medical measures to treat the cancer. The 
guardianship court denied the application because the woman did not want to leave 
the hospital and therefore did not meet the legal requirements for forced 
hospitalization. For that reason, she could not be subject to coercive medical 
treatment. 
 
In German law, the natural will of the patient limits the possibility for the legal 
representative to decide on a treatment23 and can only be overruled, if the 
requirements for the use of involuntary medical treatment are met.24 At the time of 
the order, § 1906 (3) BGB (old version) listed the requirements which are necessary 
for the approval of the guardianship court.  
 
The medical (psychiatric or somatic) treatment has to be necessary to prevent a 
threatening considerable damage to health and the rejection of the treatment by the 
patient has to be grounded on a psychiatric illness or a mental health disability.25 
Serious efforts have to be made to convince the patient to be treated voluntarily. The 
medical intervention needs to be the only possibility to prevent serious health damage 
and the expected profit has to outweigh the possible impairments. The crux of the 
case was that the provisions of § 1906 (3) BGB (old version) did not distinguish 
between the requirements of forced hospitalization and involuntary treatment. Hence, 
the law demanded in addition to other criteria the involuntary hospitalization of a 
patient when he was treated against his natural will. 
 
The criteria for the court's approval for forced hospitalization, § 1906 (1) BGB26  are 
not met if there is no deprivation of liberty, i.e. the hospitalization is not against or 
without the will of the person concerned and the patient stays in hospital voluntarily.27 
Thus, involuntary medical treatment was limited to patients who rejected 
hospitalization. 
 
In the sequence of proceedings, the BVerfG was engaged with the case having to 
decide about the compatibility of the current regulation with the German Constitution 
which necessarily required involuntary accommodation and therefore was preventing 
the woman from being treated.  
 
The woman was not treated for her breast cancer and died before the court could 
decide about § 1906 (3) BGB. Whether the woman should have been treated 
 
23 See § 1904 BGB. 
24 Forced treatment against the free will of a person is not possible. 
25 § 1906 (3) BGB (old version). 
26The legal representative can apply for forced hospitalization for two reasons. Firstly, if the patient may 
seriously endanger his health or life because of a psychiatric illness. Secondly, if to prevent a serious 
health damage or death a treatment is necessary which needs a hospitalization which the patient refuses 
because of a psychiatric illness, see § 1906 (1) No. 1 and 2 BGB.  
27 BGH, Order of 1 July 2015 - XII ZB 89/15 = FamRZ 2015, 1484, para 18-19; BGH, Order of 23 January 
2008 – XII ZB 185/07 = FamRZ 2008, 866, para 19-20. 




involuntarily, was not decided by the court, as this was not the relevant question. This 
would have implied further investigation of the requirements of involuntary medical 
treatment as the original will of the woman on the treatment of her breast cancer. 
 
III. KEY POINTS OF THE COURT’S DECISION 
 
A. The state’s duty to protect 
 
The judges decided that not having a regulation to treat people with a court-appointed 
legal representative in need of a medical treatment who cannot recognise the necessity 
of a medical measure or who cannot act in accordance with this realisation violates 
the state’s duty of protection of the right to life and physical integrity under Art. 2 (2) 
sentence 1 German Constitutional Law.28  
 
In its reasoning the court explained the origin of the state’s “duty to protect”. The 
court claimed that the constitutionally guaranteed right to life and physical integrity 
does not only guarantee a subjective defensive right of the individual against the state 
but sets up objective values that demand duties of protection on part of the state, to 
protect and support the life of individuals.29 
 
This usually undefined duty of the state takes a specific form if individuals meet the 
requirements for the appointment of a legal representative and are not able to 
recognize the necessity of a medical treatment or cannot act in this awareness due to 
their mental illness.30 As ultima ratio, a medical examination and treatment against the 
natural will of the individual must be possible.31 
 
Even though the court refers to individuals with the need of a court-appointed legal 
representative, this decision is also applicable to adults with a legal representative 
under an enduring power of attorney (Vorsorgevollmacht) who has been determined 
by the adult himself to decide on matters of deprivation of liberty and involuntary 
medical treatment.32 
 
Despite the aforementioned safeguard function of the right to life, involuntary medical 
treatment still conflicts with the person’s right to self-determination and the right to 
physical integrity.33 Generally, under German Constitutional Law all people are free to 
deal with their own health – the BVerfG called it the “freedom to illness”.34 To medically 
treat somebody because it is assumed the best out of an objective third party view 
would interfere with the general right of personality (Art. 2 (1) in conjunction with Art. 
1 (1) German Constitutional Law).35 This strictly implies that a treatment against the 
 
28 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 66-68. 
29 Ibid, para 68-69. 
30 Ibid, para 71. 
31 Ibid, para 71. 
32 See § 1906 (5) and § 1906a (5) BGB. 
33 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 74. 
34 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09, para 19; BVerfG, Order of the 
First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 74. 
35 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 74. 




free will36 is impossible, because the free will is prior to the state’s duty of protection.37 
But the person’s right to self-determination and right to physical integrity can be 
interfered with by law in cases of serious threats to the health of persons who are 
unable to protect themselves. For those cases the state has to provide the possibility 
of involuntary medical treatment under certain conditions.38 
 
This requires the absence of free will, i.e. a missing competence to decide about 
necessary treatments due to a mental disorder or illness.39 Additionally, the medical 
treatment needs to be necessary to avoid a serious threat to the person's health or life 
and must not be associated with dangerous treatment risks.40 Most importantly, there 
must not be any reason to believe that the refusal of the treatment reflects the original 
free will of the person.41 The original free will42 is a former effectively expressed legal 
will e.g. by advance directives for health care. The court stressed that this process is 
a matter of balancing the rights in every individual case and the natural will has to be 
taken into account when deciding about involuntary treatment.43 Moreover, firm 
procedural safeguards are necessary to ensure coercive treatment will only be used in 
the cases described above.44 
 
B. The compatibility of involuntary medical treatment with obligations under 
international law 
 
The court reflected arguments of the interpreting sources of the CRPD and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) concluding that coercive medical 
treatment is compatible with Germany’s obligations under international law.45 
 
The BVerfG stated that its rulings on involuntary medical treatment are in line with the 
CRPD, including Art. 12 CRPD (equal recognition before the law). Thus, they confirmed 
their statement on Art. 12 CRPD which was already specified in a previous order on 
the prerequisites for compulsory medical treatment of a forensic patient.46 The court 
affirmed that the CRPD aims at safeguarding and strengthening the autonomy of 
persons with disabilities. However, they saw no general prohibition of measures which 
are conducted against the natural will in case the capability of self-determination is 
 
36 ‘Free will’ means that the will is competent und legally effective in the matter concerned; for an 
English explanation see A. Ward, ‘A major step forward in CRPD compliance by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court?’, Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, (70), Nov. 2016, 22 30. 
37 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 75. 
38 Ibid, para 80. 
39 Ibid, para 78-79. 
40 Ibid, para 80. 
41 Ibid, para 82. 
42 For an English explanation of the term see A. Ward, ‘A major step forward in CRPD compliance by 
the German Federal Constitutional Court?’, Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, (70), Nov. 2016, 22 30. 
43 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 82. 
44 Ibid, para 84. 
45 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 87. 
46 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09. The court decided that the 
approval of forced medical treatment is not included in the approval of forced hospitalization. They 
decided that involuntary medical treatment strictly requires that the person accommodated is incapable 
of understanding the severity of his/her illness and the necessity of treatment measures or of acting in 
accordance with his or her understanding due to the illness. 




limited. On the basis of Art. 12 (4) CRPD, the BVerfG concluded that measures against 
the natural will of the person must be possible, as long as suitable safeguards are 
implemented by the state.47 
 
The court also justified its decision with regard to the reports of the UN Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee)48. In the court’s opinion the 
CRPD Committee does not impose binding decisions on how to interpret the treaty 
upon the member states,49 but its reports have to be considered and dealt with in an 
argumentative way.50 They admitted that the CRPD Committee criticized the German 
adult protection law in its Concluding observations on the initial report of Germany in 
2015.51 The CRPD Committee recommends in line with the General comment No. 1 in 
201452 on Art. 12 CRPD that all forms of substituted decision-making should be 
replaced by systems of supported decision-making.53 Yet, the court underlined that 
the CRPD Committee remained vague. It did not refer to this special case addressed 
by the court and thus did not exclude involuntary medical treatment for this situation.54  
 
The court also referred to the CRPD Committee’s interpretation of Art. 14 CRPD 
(Liberty and security of the person) in its Guidelines on article 14 of the CRPD.55 The 
BVerfG assumed that the spirit of the CRPD cannot possibly deny people who cannot 
form a free will any help. Therefore, the court stated that in their opinion the CRPD is 
not opposed to coercive treatment if it is strictly regulated.56 Additionally, the court 
emphasised that due to the German adult protection law, the will and the - if necessary 
- “supported will” of the patient have priority as demanded by the CRPD Committee.57 
The court summarised that even taking the CRPD committee’s arguments into account, 
there is no good reason under the text and spirit of the CRPD to abandon such persons 
to their fate, and to conclude that the CRPD is opposed to compulsory medical 
treatment where this is constitutionally required under strictly regulated 
circumstances.58 
 
According to the BVerfG the state’s obligation to protect and therefore use coercive 
medical treatment as ultima ratio is also in accordance with the ECHR and the case 
law of the ECtHR.59 They referred to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on Art. 8 ECHR which 
 
47 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 88 citing BVerfG, Order of the 
Second Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09. 
48 Concerning the function of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
see part IV. 
49 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 90 with further references. 
50 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 90. 
51 CRPD Committee, Concluding observations on the initial report of Germany (2015), UN Doc. 
CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1. 
52 CRPD Committee, General comment No. 1 (2014), UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1. 
53 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 91. 
54 Ibid. 
55 CRPD Committee, Guidelines on article 14 of the CRPD adopted during the Committee’s 14th session, 
September 2015, Annex to the Report of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UN 
Doc. A/72/55. 
56 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 91.  
57 Ibid, para 91. 
58 Ibid, para 91. 
59 Ibid, para 92. 




provides the right to respect one’s private life and therefore to live in self-
determination, as well as on the right to life, Art. 2 ECHR.60 The court stressed that 
the ECtHR gives the states a margin of appreciation to which extent the right to live in 
self-determination and to harm one’s health may be granted.61 The ECtHR demands 
that decisions which may lead to serious harm or death may only be accepted if the 
adult has a free will and is of sound mind.62 Otherwise the ECtHR states, that keeping 
a person from risking his or her life is manifested in Art. 2 ECHR as a duty of the 
state.63 The state has to take care that there are sufficient regulatory arrangements 
which ensure that an individual’s decision of not being treated is based on a free will.64 
Therefore, the BVerfG concluded that the ECtHR’s interpretation of Art. 2 and Art. 8 
ECHR does not contradict their own assumptions.65 
 
IV. DISCUSSION OF THE COURT’S ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Arguments concerning CRPD compliance 
 
Although the court assumed that its results are in conformity with the CRPD, some 
parts of the German adult protection law, especially concerning forced medical 
treatment, are controversial.66 In particular, the compliance with the CRPD is in 
question. This was notably expressed by the CRPD Committee in the Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Germany.67 Therefore, the various arguments 
raised by the BVerfG shall be discussed in the light of the CRPD. In addition, the court's 
understanding of the CRPD Committee's statements shall be explained. 
 
The CRPD was adopted to ensure that people with disabilities receive equal enjoyment 
of the basic rights, Art. 1 CRPD. In Germany the CRPD has the force of law and helps 
to determine the scope of fundamental human rights.68 According to Art. 4 CRPD the 
 
60 Ibid, para 93 with reference to Pretty v UK (App no 2346/02) ECHR 2002-III, 155 194, para 62-63. 
Pretty v UK deals with the legislative position on assisted suicide. 
61 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 93 with reference to Lambert 
and others v France (App no. 46043/14) ECHR 2015-III, 67 117, para 148. The case of Lambert and 
others was about the range of the state's obligation according to Art. 2 ECHR. 
62 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 94; for the requirements of 
"unsound mind" see Winterwerp v the Netherlands (App no 6301/73) ECHR Series A no. 33; Winterwerp 
v the Netherlands is a landmark decision on Art. 5 ECHR naming the minimum criteria for the lawful 
detention of people with "unsound mind". 
63 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 94 with reference to Lambert 
and others v France (App no. 46043/14) ECHR 2015-III, 67 114, para 140; dealing with the question 
whether it is an individual right to decide to end one's life Haas v Switzerland (App no 31322/07) ECHR 
2011-I, 95 117, para 54; Arskaya v Ukraine (App no 45076/05) (ECHR 5th December 2013), para 69-
70; Arskaya v Ukraine deals with the state's obligation to ensure adequate health-care regulations, 
concerning decision-making capacity of the patient. 
64 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 94 with reference to Arskaya v 
Ukraine (App no 45076/05) (ECHR 5th December 2013), para 69-70, 88. 
65 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 95. 
66 S. Schmahl,‘Menschenrechtliche Sicht auf die Zwangsbehandlung von Erwachsenen bei 
Selbstgefährdung‘, in: D. Coester-Waltjen et al. (edit.), ‘Zwangsbehandlung bei Selbstgefährdung‘, 
Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2016, [43-53]; D. Kuch, 'Wohltätiger Zwang', DÖV, 2019, 723, 730-732; 
P. Masuch and C. Gmati, ‘Zwangsbehandlung nach dem Gesetz zur Regelung der betreuungsrechtlichen 
Einwilligung in eine ärztliche Zwangsmaßnahme und UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention‘, NZS, 2013, 521. 
67 UN Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1, para 25. 
68 Incorporated in German Federal Law in 2008, see BGBl. II, 2008, p. 1419. 




Convention’s rights have to be respected in legislation and jurisprudence of the 
national courts. 
 
The CRPD Committee is a safeguard implemented by the treaty itself (Art. 34 CRPD), 
which gives advice and evaluates the state reports on legal basis of Art. 36 (1) CRPD. 
The countries report about their progress implementing the CRPD to the CRPD 
Committee, which evaluates the measures and gives general recommendations (as 
demanded by Art. 35 CRPD). An optional protocol, which was signed by Germany as 
well, gives the Committee the authority to examine individual complaints about state’s 
violations of the Convention, however, without the ability to sanction them.69  
 
In several decisions, the BVerfG already confirmed that it does not consider the 
statements of the CRPD Committee as binding, neither on international nor national 
courts.70 Regardless of the content of the UN Committee's statements, the BVerfG's 
view seems plausible. Primarily, the interpretation of the treaty is the duty of the 
member states and has to focus on the treaty’s intention, Art. 31 (1) Vienna 
Convention71. In addition, the competence of committees developed by human rights 
treaties is not uniformly valued.72 Therefore, the CRPD Committee as an organ 
implemented by the treaty itself, does not necessarily provide an obligatory 
interpretation of the CRPD. In Germany, the CRPD is implemented in national law and 
is reviewed within the national jurisdictions. Unlike the ECHR, the CRPD is not reviewed 
by an international court like the ECtHR who may take binding decisions. The 
committee cannot be accorded the same status. Their interpretations (such as the 
concluding observations) are not legally binding, they only "shall make … suggestions 
and general recommendations" Art. 36 (1) CRPD.73 Yet, the CRPD Committee plays an 
important role in the unification of interpretation and the supervision of 
implementation. Therefore, as said by the court, their argumentation is important and 
has to be well considered.74 
 
The question remains whether the considerations of the BVerfG concerning the 
justification of involuntary medical treatment for vulnerable adults comply with the 
CRPD. The CRPD Committee’s interpretation clearly rejects any form of restricting 
autonomy and especially involuntary medical treatment as a form of substituted 
decision-making.75 The General comment No. 1 on the interpretation of the CRPD 
articles criticized involuntary medical treatment, declaring it to be in violation of Art. 
 
69 See Art. 6 and 7 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
70 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 90; confirmatory BVerfG, Order 
of the Second Senate of 24 July 2018 – 2 BvR 309/15, 2 BvR 502/16, para 90-91 = BVerfGE 149, 293. 
71 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature Vienna 23 May 1969 and entered 
into force in Germany, 20 August 1987. 
72 See A. Ward, ‘A major step forward in CRPD compliance by the German Federal Constitutional Court?’, 
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, (70), Nov. 2016, 22 26 with reference to HRC, General Comment No 
33, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 of 5 November 2008, para 13. 
73 G. Szmukler, 'The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 'Rights, will and 
preferences' in relation to mental health disabilities‘, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry (54), 
2017, 90 91 speaks of the CRPD Committee's interpretations as ‘authoritative‘ but not ‘legally binding‘. 
74 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 90. 
75 UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, para 7, 9, 42; UN Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1, para 26, 37-38. 




1776, Art. 1577, Art. 1678 and Art. 12 of the Convention.79 The CRPD Committee insists 
that all medical interventions relating to physical or mental integrity shall be based on 
the free and informed consent of the individual.80 They attested the member states a 
“general failure to understand”81 the treaty’s intention on supported decision-making 
and requested to make alternative assistance available.82  
 
Furthermore, the CRPD Committee presented their opinion on the German rules on 
compulsory medical treatment and the German adult protection law in their Concluding 
observations on the initial report of Germany in 2015.83 The legal instrument of 
“Betreuung”84 was declared incompatible with the CRPD.85 They criticized the use of 
compulsory treatment and recommended the elimination of all forms of substituted 
decision-making.86 
 
Despite the CRPD Committee’s obvious position on involuntary treatment, the BVerfG 
asserted that the CRPD Committee did not consider the special situation addressed in 
the order.87 Looking at the CRPD Committee's reports, this can be confirmed. They did 
not explicitly focus on people with serious mental illnesses which are in a life-
threatening condition. Furthermore, they did not state that the member states have to 
accept the death of persons with impaired decision-making capacity. 
 
The BVerfG also affirmed that its argumentation complies with the CRPD Committee’s 
guidelines regarding the interpretation of Art. 14 CRPD.88 The guidelines declare that 
during deprivation of liberty there shall be no medical measures for the protection of 
health without  the free and informed consent of the person concerned.89 Therefore, 
the BVerfG concluded that the CRPD Committee demands the state to abandon 
coercive treatment.90 However, the court assumed that the CRPD Committee’s 
statement cannot exclude people who cannot give their consent from access to medical 
treatment.91 The CRPD Committee itself has seen a need for exceptions in cases when 
no will can be determined, such like a coma. In such cases, the "best interpretation of 
will and preferences"92 may be applied. To the German Constitutional Court the term 
 
76 Protecting the integrity of the person. 
77 Freedom of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
78 Freedom from exploitation, violence and abuse. 
79 UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, para 42. 
80 Ibid, para 41. 
81 UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, para 3. 
82 UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, para 3, 28-29; Criticising the uncompromising stance of the CRPD Committee 
S. Schmahl, ‘Stellung und Rolle der UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention im Gefüge des universellen 
Menschenrechtsschutzsystems‘, in: A. Diekmann et al. (edit.), ‘Betreuungsrecht im internationalen 
Kontext‘, Eigenverlag Betreuungsgerichtstag e.V., 2017, 82 89. 
83 UN Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1. 
84 See footnote 16. 
85 UN Doc. CRPD/C/DEU/CO/1, para 25. 
86 Ibid, para 26, 37-38. 
87 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 91. 
88 Ibid, para 91 referring to the Guidelines on Art. 14 CRPD. 
89 Guidelines on article 14 of the CRPD, UN Doc. A/72/55, no. 11. 
90 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 91. 
91 A. Ward, ‘A major step forward in CRPD compliance by the German Federal Constitutional Court?’, 
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, (70), Nov. 2016, 22 28-29. 
92 UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, para 21. 




“free and informed consent” in Art. 25 (d) CRPD implies that whether or not the 
incapability to give the free and informed consent refers to a coma or a mental illness, 
the treatment should still be given93 if it reflects the original or presumed free will94 of 
the person. 
 
To understand the BVerfG's interpretation of the CRPD Committee's statements, one 
must assume that the court's arguments are based on two ideas. Firstly, the court 
assumes that the rights of the individual, namely Art. 12 and Art. 10 or Art. 25 CRPD 
respectively, can be weighed against each other under certain circumstances in cases 
of serious threats to life and health. Secondly, to clarify the stance of the court, one 
has to assume that there is a distinction between a natural and a free will.95 
 
The fundamental idea of the CRPD is to promote equality and equal treatment of 
persons with disabilities. Yet, the view of the BVerfG that Art. 12 CRPD is not granted 
without respecting the other rights of an individual as long as the interventions are 
objectively justified and proportionate,96 is also supported by the convention's text.  
 
Involuntary medical treatment of persons with impaired decision-making capacity is 
not explicitly prohibited by the CRPD. An earlier draft of the CRPD planned to strictly 
regulate coercive measures in Art. 17 CRPD.97 Though, it was not included in the 
conventions final text. However, no regulation of involuntary medical treatment does 
not indicate a prohibition.98  
 
Furthermore, the CRPD’s aim is to protect life and health of the person as stated in 
Art. 10 and 25 CRPD. In cases of conflict, those rights have to be carefully considered 
for the individual.99 Therefore, the text of the CRPD does not generally exclude the 
right to protect the life in favour of guaranteeing autonomy if the person requires 
support.100 In the international discussion, too, efforts have been made to find 
 
93 A. Ward, ‘A major step forward in CRPD compliance by the German Federal Constitutional Court?’, 
Mental Capacity Law Newsletter, (70), Nov. 2016, 22 29. 
94 On the basis of known values which are important to the person, a third person interprets the will 
and preferences representatively for the concerned person. 
95 Medical treatment against the free will of the person is not possible. 
96 V. Lipp, ‘Erwachsenenschutz, gesetzliche Vertretung und Artikel 12 UN-BRK‘, in: V. Aichele (edit.) ‘Das 
Menschenrecht auf gleiche Anerkennung vor dem Recht‘, Nomos, 2013, 329 335-336; R. Marschner, 
‘Menschen in Krisen: Unterbringung und Zwangsbehandlung in der Psychiatrie‘, in: V. Aichele (edit.) 
‘Das Menschenrecht auf gleiche Anerkennung vor dem Recht‘, Nomos, 2013, 203 221. 
97 R. Kayess and P. French, ‘Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’, HRLR, 2008, 1 29-30. 
98 Ibid, 30 R. Kayess and P. French see no opposition by the Ad Hoc Committee to forced medical 
treatment. 
99 R. Marschner, ‘UN-Konvention über die Rechte von Menschen mit Behinderungen – Auswirkungen auf 
das Betreuungs- und Unterbringungsrecht‘, R&P, 2009, 135 137; M.C. Freeman et al., ‘Reversing hard 
won victories in the name of human rights: a critique of the General Comment on Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities‘, Lancet Psychiatry, 2015, 844-850. 
100 Same opinion S. Schmahl,‘Menschenrechtliche Sicht auf die Zwangsbehandlung von Erwachsenen 
bei Selbstgefährdung‘, in: D. Coester-Waltjen et al. (edit.), ‘Zwangsbehandlung bei Selbstgefährdung‘, 
Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2016, 43 52; P. Masuch and C. Gmati, ‘Zwangsbehandlung nach dem 
Gesetz zur Regelung der betreuungsrechtlichen Einwilligung in eine ärztliche Zwangsmaßnahme und 
UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention‘ NZS, 2013, 521 526. 




solutions to these ethical conflict situations.101 Possible state interventions should be 
disability-neutral.102 
 
Furthermore, the safeguard function of Art. 12 (4) CRPD, "the state parties shall ensure 
that measures taken to exercise legal capacity are appropriate and proportional to the 
person’s rights and interests", indicates that substituted decision-making as a last 
resort is also covered by the treaties text. In 2011, the BVerfG confirmed that Article 
12 CRPD does not forbid measures which limit self-determination in general.103 
Following this decision, the BVerfG has based its position upon Art. 12 (4) CRPD.104 It 
stated that ”the context of the provision in Art. 12 (4) CRPD, which expressly relates 
to measures limiting persons concerned in their legal capacity and agency, proves that 
the Convention does not prohibit such measures in general, but that it limits their 
permissibility inter alia by obliging the signatories to the Convention under Art. 12 (4) 
CRPD to provide for suitable safeguards against conflicts of interests, misuse and 
disregard, and to ensure proportionality”.105 Thus, the court extended the 
requirements of Art. 12 (4) CRPD to involuntary medical treatment. 
 
Though in Germany many scholars generally agree that forced medical treatment 
complies with the CRPD,106 the interpretations of Art. 12 CRPD differ: For instance, 
Lachwitz limits Art. 12 (4) CRPD to supportive measures provided by Art. 12 (3) 
CRPD.107 This would exclude forced medical treatment. It is widely agreed on that Art. 
12 (3) CRPD may give a right to support but does not force support upon the person.108  
 
101 Giving an overview of the different approaches L. Series and A. Nilsson, in: I. Bantekas & M. Stein & 
D. Anastasiou (eds), ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: a commentary’, 
Oxford University Press, 2018, Art. 12, 339 357. 
102 For example, E. Flynn and A. Arstein-Kerslake, 'State intervention in the lives of people with 
disabilities: the case for a disability-neutral framework', International Journal of Law in Context, (13), 
39 [49-52]. 
103 BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 882/09, para 52-53. 
104 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 88. 
105 Ibid, para 88 with reference to BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 23 March 2011 – 2 BvR 
882/09, para 52-53. 
106 S. Schmahl, ‘Menschenrechtliche Sicht auf die Zwangsbehandlung von Erwachsenen bei 
Selbstgefährdung‘, in: D. Coester-Waltjen et al. (edit.), ‘Zwangsbehandlung bei Selbstgefährdung‘, 
Universitätsverlag Göttingen, 2016, [43-53]; P. Masuch and C. Gmati, ‘Zwangsbehandlung nach dem 
Gesetz zur Regelung der betreuungsrechtlichen Einwilligung in eine ärztliche Zwangsmaßnahme und 
UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention‘, NZS, 2013, 521 [526]; V. Lipp, ‘Erwachsenenschutz, gesetzliche 
Vertretung und Artikel 12 UN-BRK‘ in: V. Aichele (edit.) ‘Das Menschenrecht auf gleiche Anerkennung 
vor dem Recht’, Nomos, 2013, 329 [335]. 
107 K. Lachwitz, ‘Übereinkommen der Vereinten Nationen über die Rechte von Menschen mit 
Behinderung‘, BtPrax, 2008, 143 147; ibid, ‘Funktion und Anwendungsbereich der „Unterstützung“ 
(„support“) bei der Ausübung der Rechts-und Handlungsfähigkeit gemäß Artikel 12 UN-BRK – 
Anforderungen aus der Perspektive von Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung‘, in: V. Aichele (edit.) ‘Das 
Menschenrecht auf gleiche Anerkennung vor dem Recht‘, Nomos, 2013, 67 84-85; also W. Kaleck, S. 
Hilbrans and S. Scharmer, Gutachterliche Stellungnahme (2008), 32, available at https://www.die-
bpe.de/stellungnahme/stellungnahme.pdf (last accessed 28th Dec. 2019.  
108 S. Baufeld, ‘Zur Vereinbarkeit von Zwangseinweisungen und -behandlungen psychisch Kranker mit 
der UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention‘, R&P, 2009, 167 172 referring to the word “provide”; K. 
Lachwitz, ‘Funktion und Anwendungsbereich der „Unterstützung“ („support“) bei der Ausübung der 
Rechts-und Handlungsfähigkeit gemäß Artikel 12 UN-BRK – Anforderungen aus der Perspektive von 
Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung‘, in: V. Aichele (ed) ‘Das Menschenrecht auf gleiche Anerkennung 
vor dem Recht‘, Nomos, 2013, 67 75; V. Lipp, ‘Erwachsenenschutz, gesetzliche Vertretung und Artikel 
12 UN-BRK‘ in: V. Aichele (edit.) ‘Das Menschenrecht auf gleiche Anerkennung vor dem Recht’, Nomos, 





However, this does not imply that interventions through substituted decision-making 
cannot be involved as a last resort.109 As a strict regulation for “unwanted” measures 
would be much more essential, Lipp states that restricting sec. 4 to required measures 
in Art. 12 (3) CRPD would limit the safeguard function of Art. 12 (4) CRPD 
enormously.110 Therefore, the requirements of Art. 12 (4) CRPD apply to every 
intervention in the persons legal capacity.111 Even though the CRPD encourages the 
state to strengthen supported decision-making in the first place, to meet the 
requirements for appropriate help and to establish safeguards, it does not explicitly 
exclude involuntary medical treatment. 
 
However, the CRPD Committee does not follow the idea of different qualities of will 
and does not distinguish between free and natural will.112 As the free will cannot be 
scientifically and objectively determined, the fact that the BVerfG does not make any 
observations on this point, even though their argumentation bases on this assumption, 
can certainly be criticised.113 Yet, the system of giving different legal weight to different 
"qualities" of will also allows an allocation of responsibilities, which protects the 
individual.114 Not regulating specific standards for the quality of human actions would 
imply giving legal weight to any kind of human action and make vulnerable people 
receptive to manipulation. Furthermore, advance statements would be of limited use 
when the conserved will would contradict the natural will and thus could not be 
respected when deciding about medical treatment. One also has to take into account 
that the absence of free will in the sense of the BVerfG does not describe a legal status 
of a person but the lack of a condition for a legally binding will concerning a particular 
medical intervention. The legal status of the individual as a person before the law and 
the legal capacity in general are not questioned. The distinction of free and natural will 
is therefore not opposed to Art. 12 CRPD. 
 
Even interpretations by researchers with legal backgrounds which are not used to the 
distinction of natural and free will still come to similar conclusions as the BVerfG on 
the basis of Art. 12 (4) CRPD. For example, Ward and Curk or Szmukler conclude that 
different interests of the individual must be weighed against each other by dividing the 
terms "will and preferences", giving "will" and "preference" different value in the will 
determination process.115  
 
2013, 329 332 referring to the word „support”. Other opinions see forced medical treatment as a part 
of „support“ in Art. 12 (3) CRPD P. Masuch and C. Gmati, ‘Zwangsbehandlung nach dem Gesetz zur 
Regelung der betreuungsrechtlichen Einwilligung in eine ärztliche Zwangsmaßnahme und UN-
Behindertenrechtskonvention‘, NZS, 2013, 521 526-527. 
109 "Art. 12 [CRPD] does not prohibit substituted decision-making", A. Dhanda, Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 34 (2007), 429, [460-461]. 
110 V. Lipp, ‘Betreuungsrecht und UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention‘, FamRZ, 2012, 669 673-674. 
111 V. Lipp, ‘Betreuungsrecht und UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention‘, FamRZ, 2012, 669 673-674. 
112 UN Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1, para 13–15. 
113 R. Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘annotation on BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 
8/15’, FamRZ, 2016, 1746-1747; general criticism on the term 'natural will' R. Beckmann, 'Der 
"natürliche Wille" – ein unnatürliches Rechtskonstrukt', JZ, 2013, [604-608]. 
114 J. Neuner, 'Natürlicher und freier Wille', AcP, 2018, 1 [18]. 
115 A. Ward and P. Curk, ‘"Respecting 'will': Viscount Stair and online shopping"‘, BtPrax, 2019, 54-58; 
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B. Arguments concerning ECHR compliance 
 
As the decisions of the ECtHR are binding on the courts of the ECHR parties,116 they 
are an important variable in national human rights implementation. The interpretation 
of the ECtHR on Art. 2 and Art. 8 ECHR supports the assumptions of the BVerfG, as 
explained in more detail below. 
 
Art. 8 ECHR includes the right to make decisions that can be dangerous or harmful to 
one’s health.117 Medical treatment against the free will would violate this freedom even 
if the denial of treatment may lead to death.118 Art. 2 ECHR provides the right to life. 
As well as the BVerfG, the ECtHR argued that the right to life obliges the authorities 
to protect an individual from itself under certain circumstances.119 The ECtHR's 
requirements for the states to protect life and health of vulnerable adults can be seen 
in Arskaya v. Ukraine.120 The ECtHR confirmed that Art. 2 ECHR obligates the state to 
protect the patient’s life.121 Yet, with respect to Art. 8 ECHR they saw no obligation of 
the state to prevent an individual from taking his or her own life if the decision has 
been taken freely and with full understanding.122 This implies that if conditions of a 
sound mind are not met, the duty to protect the individual’s life maintains. The ECtHR 
also criticised that in this particular case no domestic regulations were at hand which 
sufficiently elaborated the conditions under which refusal to undergo treatment was 
valid and binding on medical staff.123 They mentioned the necessity to implement a 
regulatory framework, which shall ensure that a patient’s decision-making capacity is 
objectively evaluated in a fair and proper procedure.124 
 
The ECtHR explained that not ensuring adequate health-care regulations which 
sufficiently elaborate as to whether the rejection of treatment by the patient is valid 
violates Art. 2 ECHR.125 This implies that if the state had considered the patient 
 
in relation to mental health disabilities‘, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, (54), 2017, 90 93-
96. 
116 Concerning the relationship of German Constitutional law and the ECHR see BVerfGE 111, 307 = 
BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of 14 October 2004 – 2 BvR 1481/04, para 30-39; BVerfGE 128, 
326 = BVerfG, Judgement of the Second Senate 4 May 2011 – 2 BvR 2365/09, 740/10, 2333/08, 
1152/10, 571/10, para 86-90. 
117 Arskaya v Ukraine (App no 45076/05) (ECHR 5th December 2013), para 69; Pretty v UK (App no 
2346/02) ECHR 2002-III 155 194, para 63. 
118 BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of 26 July 2016 – 1 BvL 8/15, para 93 referring to Lambert and 
others v France (App no 46043/14) ECHR 2015-III, 67 109, para 120 and Pretty v UK (App no 2346/02) 
ECHR 2002-III 155 194, para 62-63. 
119 Thematic Report, Health-related issues in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, June 
2015, p. 19 referring to Keenan v UK (App no 27229/95) ECHR 2001-III, 93 available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_health.pdf (last accessed 28th Dec. 2019); 
About the duty of protection by the state concerning denied necessary treatment of a mentally disabled 
person in a psychiatric institution see Câmpeanu v Rumania (App no 47848/08) (ECHR 17th July 2014), 
para 130. 
120 Arskaya v Ukraine (App no 45076/05) (ECHR 5th December 2013). 
121 Ibid, para 62. 
122 Ibid, para 69. 
123 Ibid, para 88. 
124 Ibid, para 88. 
125 Ibid, para 69. 




incapable of making a valid treatment decision, the patient would have been treated 
against his wishes to protect his life. As seen in Herczegfalvy v. Austria, the ECtHR 
does not categorically exclude involuntary medical treatment as long as it is 
therapeutically indicated.126 
 
Moreover, the ECtHR as a human rights institution at European level also tends to 
consider the CRPD as 'relevant international law' in its judgements.127 The ECtHR 
explained its understanding of Art. 12 (4) CRPD in A.-M.V. v. Finland128: "the applicant's 
rights, will and preferences were taken into account" as long as the state authorities 
had properly balanced the right to self-determination and the protection of the health 
of the person.129 
 
Those decisions of the ECtHR indicate that the ECHR demands a state’s duty of 
protection for vulnerable people as well. The ECtHR is not opposed to involuntary 
medical treatment as long as the countries provide a regulatory framework.130 It can 
be concluded that the order of the BVerfG does not contradict the ECtHR's case-law 
and therefore complies with the ECHR. 
 
V. IMPACTS ON GERMAN LAW 
 
As a consequence to the order of the BVerfG, § 1906a BGB was introduced in July 
2017.131 Forced hospitalization and involuntary medical treatment are now regulated 
in two different paragraphs. Involuntary treatment no longer requires forced 
hospitalization. However, it requires an in-patient stay at a suitable facility which can 
guarantee the necessary medical standards for the treatment. Furthermore, the law 
confirms that involuntary medical treatment has to comply with the original will of the 
patient, for example in an advance directive for health care.132 An involuntary medical 
treatment at home, in ambulatory practices or in nursing homes remains prohibited.  
 
Of course, the order of the BVerfG has been met with varying response in Germany. 
Some researchers and psychiatrists criticize an expansion of the possibilities for forced 
 
126 Herczegfalvy v Austria (App no 10533/83) ECHR Series A no. 244, para 82. 
127 L. Waddington, 'The Domestication of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities', in: 
A. Waddington and A. Lawson (eds), 'The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
Practice', Oxford University Press, 2018, 538 [554]; see for example A.-M.V. v Finland (App no 
53251/13) (ECHR 23rd March 2017). 
128 A.-M.V. v Finland (App no 53251/13) (ECHR 23rd March 2017). 
129 A.-M.V. v Finland (App no 53251/13) (ECHR 23rd March 2017), para 90. 
130 More restrictive E. Flynn, ‘Disability, Deprivation Of Liberty and Human Rights Norms: Reconciling 
European and International Approaches‘, International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law, 2016, 
75 88-89 who finds that the ECtHR assumes that in specific situations the state has to protect the life 
of the patient, even though other rights may be restricted, but pledges for a more CRPD-friendly 
interpretation of the ECHR and the ECtHR decisions. 
131 The current law on compulsory medical treatment is § 1906a BGB, introduced by BGBl. I, 2017, p. 
2426. 
132 See § 1906a (1) No. 3 BGB. 




medical treatment.133 Other scholars call for an extension to forced medical treatment 
without a necessary inpatient stay.134  
 
The effects of the new § 1906a BGB will have to be observed.135 On the positive side, 
however, the consideration of advance statements for health care for forced medical 
treatment was strengthened significantly.136 If the patient has denied a somatic or 
psychiatric treatment in an advance directive for health care that meets the legal 
requirements such as being able to consent at the time of writing down that statement, 
the will of the patient has to be respected even though the denial of treatment might 




Even though there are many points of criticism and the decision of the BVerfG 
contradicts the general trend to interpret the CRPD such as the statements of the 
CRPD Committee, it can be concluded that the order complies with both, the legal 
requirements of the CRPD and the ECHR. 
 
Despite the focus on self-determination, the protection of the individual (even against 
oneself) by the state remains an objective of the human rights treaties. The CRPD 
does not focus on self-determination alone. Primarily, the treaty's intention is the 
protection of vulnerable people, including the obligation to balance the rights of the 
individual in each case.  
 
This approach corresponds to the view of the ECtHR on the ECHR. The ECtHR does 
not explicitly mention involuntary medical treatment in its judgements, but the state's 
obligation to protect the life if the patient cannot decide with "sound mind". Thus, it is 
the logical conclusion that – if not treating violates the patient's right to life – 
involuntary medical treatment must be possible. 
 
Therefore, in the context of the human rights framework, the BVerfG presents a 
concrete and solid answer concerning the difficult question on how to deal with people 
suffering from severe mental illnesses who cannot express a free will and face serious 
health damage or death. The court's understanding of the CRPD's articles happens in 
the light of its own national jurisprudence. Yet, it offers impulses on how to interpret 
them and transfer their contents as Art. 12 (4) CRPD "will and preferences" to practical 
use. Looking at the current challenge of practical implementation of the CRPD, it is 
 
133 For instance A. Schmidt-Recla, 'Karlsruhe „On Liberty“', MedR, 2017, [92-96]; M. Zinkler, Statement 
on the draft law on § 1906a BGB, available at 
http://www.antipsychiatrieverlag.de/artikel/recht/pdf/zinkler-1906a.pdf (last accessed 20th Dec. 2019); 
earlier publication M. Zinkler, 'Germany without Coercive Treatment in Psychiatry – A 15 Month Real 
World Experience', (Vol. 5), Laws, 2016, [1-6]. 
134 For instance A. Spickhoff, 'Nach der Reform ist vor der Reform: Zur Neuregelung der 
Zwangsbehandlung im Zivilrecht', FamRZ, 2017, [1633-1639]; A. Brilla, in: 'Beck'scher Online 
Grosskommentar BGB', Gsell et al. (edit.), § 1906a, para 14-15. 
135 According to Art. 7 of 'Gesetz zur Änderung der materiellen Zulässigkeitsvoraussetzungen von 
ärztlichen Zwangsmaßnahmen und zur Stärkung des Selbstbestimmungsrechts von Betreuten' of 17th 
July 2017, BGBl. I, 2017, p. 2426, § 1906a BGB will be evaluated in 2020. 
136 See § 1906a (1) no. 3. 
137 See § 1906a (1) no. 3 and § 1901a (1) BGB. 




quite evident that even if the existing mental health law systems have to be viewed 
critically, practicable interpretations are targeted.138  
 
However, the legal justification of protective measures against the natural will on part 
of the state will remain of particular interest to legal, medical and ethical researchers, 
especially, the interpretation of Art. 12 (4) CRPD "will and preferences" as there is not 
only one way of interpreting the article.139 Whichever approach is taken, the focus has 
to remain on exercising the patient’s will. 
 
The BVerfG allows involuntary medical treatment as a last resort, if it is based on the 
original or presumed will of the adult. An effective way to respect will and preferences 
in this context, is to strengthen the establishment and use of voluntary measures such 
as advance directives to determine the original will.140 
 
In Germany, there is still potential to develop legal and practical concepts to implement 
the ideas of the CRPD. Since the current periodic state report of Germany draws upon 
the BVerfG judgment141, the reaction from the CRPD Committee remains to be seen. 
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Prevention of Compulsory Interventions in Mental Health Care‘, Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2019, article 
137, 1-3. 
139 A. Ward and P. Curk, ‘"Respecting 'will': Viscount Stair and online shopping"‘, BtPrax, 2019, 54-58; 
G. Szmukler, 'The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 'Rights, will and preferences' 
in relation to mental health disabilities‘, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, (54), 2017, 90-
97. 
140 On the current status of voluntary measures see, for example, the report by A. Ward, ‘Enabling 
Citizens To Plan For Incapacity’, CDCJ(2017)2final; on the challenges of psychiatry specific advance 
decision-making in particular, G.S. Owen, et al., ‘Advance decision-making in mental health – 
Suggestions for legal reform in England and Wales‘, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 64, 
2019, 162-177; also emphasizing on advance directives as a forward solution F. Mahomed, M. A. Stein 
and V. Patel, ‘Involuntary mental health treatment in the era of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities‘, PLoS Medicine, October 2018, 1 5-6; M. Scholten and J. Gather, 
‘Adverse consequences of article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for 
persons with mental disabilities and an alternative way forward‘, J Med Ethics, (44), 2018, 226 231-
232. 
141 Federal Ministery of Labour and Social Affairs, Combined second and third periodic report of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, submitted September 2019, [21], available in English at 
https://www.gemeinsam-einfach-
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